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I. INTRODUCTION

The right of property is mostly protected by regional instruments of
human rights. Among these, one provision stands out: Article 1 of the
First Optional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.' Based on this provision, the
European Commission and Court of Human Rights have developed an
influential case-law on interferences with property. According to these
institutions, the state is not prevented from interfering with the use of
property: a measure that produces this result is justified when the
correspondent authorities observe a balancing test between the interests
of the individual and those of the community. For this purpose, a wide
margin of appreciation is given to the state. 2 The European Commission
and Court have recognized three related rules in this provision:
interferences with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, the
deprivation of property, and the control on its use. These rules are
found, respectively, in the first sentence of Article 1, in the second
sentence of the same paragraph, and in its second paragraph.
Distinguishing among these rules is not easy in practice. The
European Court has construed the concept of expropriation
restrictively. 4 The notion of control on the use of property, on the other
hand, has been interpreted broadly. 5 In this context, the tribunal will
consider other interferences only when it is not able to establish a
deprivation or a control on the use.6 From the three forms of
interference that comprise Article 1, only deprivations require
compensation to be considered lawful. In this respect, the state will
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation at the moment of establishing the
sum due, especially in cases of nationalization. As a general rule, the
European Court requires an amount reasonably related with the propert
taken: full compensation, however, is not guaranteed for every taking.
If there is no formal extinction of legal rights, an indirect expropriation
will require a substantial interference with the right of property.
According to the tribunal, a taking occurs when the property is left with
no possible use or economic value. 8
In conformity with Article 1, measures that deprive an individual or
legal entity of the use of his/hers/its possessions must be adopted in the
public interest. "Public interest" is not defined in the First Protocol, but
the European Court has identified it as "general interest" (in other
words: public purpose, as it is commonly known in international law).
This requires a fair balance between the welfare of the individual and
1.

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

(2002), amended by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 & 13, availableat http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/
rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC1 3-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf.
2. See infra Part IV.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See infra Part IX.
6. See infra Part XI.
7. See infra Parts IV & VIII.
8. See infra Part V.
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the community. The European Court will respect the exercise of the
sovereign right to expropriate. As a consequence, a wide margin of
appreciation will also be given to the national authorities at the moment
ofjudging the public interest of the respective measure.9

II. THE EUROPEAN

CONVENTION AND PROPERTY

The right of property has been dubbed "the problem child of the
European family of rights and freedoms."' 0 The earliest list of basic
civil and political rights considered by the first drafting committee of
the European Convention on Human Rights included the right of
property, but was later deleted on the suggestion that it was not a
fundamental requirement of a democratic society." According to
Merrills and Robertson, it was then clear that the inclusion of property
would only be acceptable to Western socialist governments if the
relevant provision would not prevent states from nationalizing private
property. 2 The Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers decided
not to defer the signature of the Convention until an agreement on an
acceptable wording for this right, and those of education and to free
elections, would be reached.13 The right of property was, therefore, not
included in the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms.14 The aim of this treaty was to "encourage
a cohesive democratic bloc of countries [that would serve] as a buttress
against the resurgence of national socialism and totalitarian
communism."15 The Convention had to reflect the views of the
9.
10.
REv. 543,
11.

See infra Part VII.
David Anderson, Compensation for Interference with Property, 4 EUR. HUM. RTs. L.
545 (1999).
See J. G. MERRILLS & A. H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS INEUROPE: A STUDY OF THE

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 7-9 (4th ed. 2001); DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 655 (2d ed. 2009); Christian Tomuschat, The

European Court of Human Rights and Investment Protection [hereinafter Tomuschat, The
European Court ofHuman Rights], in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21sT CENTURY
636,638 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW].
12. See MERRILLS & ROBERTSON, supra note 11, at 12.

13. See id. at 12-13.
14. European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, Nov. 4, 1950, 5-32,
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DCl3-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/O/CON
VENTIONENGWEB.pdf. This treaty entered into force in 1953. United Nations, Treaty
Series: Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed and Recorded with the
Secretariat of the United Nations, Cumulative Index No. 41, 14, http://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/Cumulative%20Index/UNTS%2OVolume%2ONo%202201-2250/cumindex.chrono.
en.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Treaty Series].
15. Helen Mountfield, Regulatory Expropriations in Europe: The Approach of the
European Court ofHuman Rights, 11 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 136, 138 (2002).
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members of the Council of Europe, which ranged from capitalist to
socialist states. For this purpose, its drafters tried to include those core
values that "create and maintain a democratic society," while at the
same time respecting the political, social and economic differences of
the parties present at the moment of its signature.' 6
Two years later, however, an agreement on the wording of the
protection of property was reached." Incorporated in Article 1 of the
First Optional Protocol to the European Convention, it said:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.' 8
The difficulties that surrounded the introduction of the right of
property, among those protected by the European Convention, explain
that Article 1 neither mentions expropriation as such, nor expressly
includes the right to be compensated. This right is only implied in the
reference to general principles of international law regarding
deprivations of property, a formula adopted as a compromise between
those states in favor of mentioning compensation and those against it.19
Despite these difficulties, the problem child did come of age: Article I
is, at present, the second most frequently invoked guarantee of the
European Convention on Human Rights.20
After its adoption, Article 1 was soon criticized in doctrine as an
inadequate and excessively weak provision, establishing an economic
and social entitlement rather than a proper right. 2 1 The European Court
16. Id. at 138-39.
17. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 33.
18. Id. Signed in 1952, the First Protocol came into force in 1954. UN. Treaty Series,
supranote 14.
19. H616ne Ruiz Fabri, The Approach Taken by the European Court of Human Rights to
the Assessment of Compensationfor "Regulatory Expropriations" of the Property of Foreign
Investors, I1 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 148, 151 (2002).
20. Luzius Wildhaber & Isabelle Wildhaber, Recent Case Law on the Protection of
Property in the European Convention on Human Rights [hereinafter Wildhaber & Wilhaber,
Recent Case Law], in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 657.
21. Mountfield, supra note 15, at 139-40; see Anderson, supra note 10, at 545;
I RicHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HuMAN RIGHTS 1301-02 (2000).
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of Human Rights, however, has not shared this vision. According to the
European Court of Human Rights, by recognizing the right to the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions, Article I is in substance
guaranteeing the right of property of both tangible and intangible assets.
The wording of the other official version, the French text, of the
European Convention confirms the conclusion of the Court. In the
French text, the first paragraph of Article I mentions "biens" and
"propridt,"instead of "possessions." 22 In this context, the European
Commission and Court have interpreted "possessions" to include
contractual rights 23 company shares, 4 goodwill in a business, 25 fishing
rights, 26 patents, and planning permissions.
As Luigi Condorelli explains, neither the Commission nor the Court
identified with precision the contours of the right of property, thus
allowing the progressive enlargement of this legal concept according to
the needs of an evolving society. 29 But such an approach is not limitless.
22.

See George Gretton, The ProtectionofProperty Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ScoTs

LAW 275, 276-77 (Alan Boyle et al. eds., 2002). The European Court, however, has not
considered the right to acquire property as protected by the Convention. See Marckx v. Belgium,
App. No. 6833/74, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 63 (1979), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57534; see also Moskal v. Poland, App. No. 10373/05, Eur.
Ct. H.R. §§ 38, 40 (2009), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-94009.
23. See A., B. & Co. A.S. v. Germany, App. No. 7742/76, 14 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 146 § 2 (1978), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00173799.
24. See generally Bramelid v. Sweden, App Nos. 8588/79 & 8589/79, 29 Eur. Comm'n.
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 64 (1982), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?
i=001-74445.
25. See Van Marie v. Netherlands, App. Nos. 8543/79, 8674/79, 8675/79 & 8685/79, 101
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 39-42 (1986), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=00 1-57590.
26. See generally Baner v. Sweden, App. No. 11763/85, 60 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 128 (ser. A) (1989), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-992.
27. See generally Smith Kline v. Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87, 66 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 70 (1990), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-738.
28. See generally Pine Valley Devs., Ltd. v. Ireland, App. No. 12742/87, 222 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1991), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00157711. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1305-07; HARIS ET AL., supranote 11, at
656-62; ROBIN C.A. WHITE ET AL., JACOBS, WHITE AND OVEY: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 481-88 (5th ed. 2010); Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights,
supra note 11, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 646-47; Wildhaber &
Wildhaber, Recent Case Law, supra note 20, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note

11, at 659-64.
29. Luigi Condorelli, Premier Protocole Additionnel: Article 1, in LA CONVENTION
EUROPtENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 971, 975 (Louis-Edmond Pettiti et al. eds., 1999). See

also Ursula Kriebaum, Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative to Investor-State
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The European Court, for example, did not consider the enjoyment of
aesthetic or environmental qualities of possessions as guaranteed under

Article 1.30
The meaning given by the European Court to the term possessions is
an autonomous one.3 Consequently, the determination of its existence
in a specific situation is not affected by the non-recognition of an
interest as a right or its legal qualification, when recognized, under the
relevant municipal law. Nevertheless, the correspondent applicant
must demonstrate that his interest has an economic value. That is to say,
what Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson call, "a legal right to some
benefit, even if it be contingent upon satisfaction of certain
conditions."33
III. EXPECTATIONS AND THE THREE RULES
Expectations are generally not regarded as possessions because they
lack the necessary degree of certainty or concreteness.3 4 In some cases,
the European Court has considered them within this concept, if they
have a sufficient basis in national law. 35 "Legitimate expectation[s] ...
must be of a nature more concrete than a mere hope." 36 Licenses to

Arbitration? [hereinafter Kriebaum, Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative], in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 219, 232-33 (Pierre-

Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW].

30. CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1307. See also YUTAKA ARAI ET AL.,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 865-66 (Pieter van

Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006).
31. Gasus Dosier v. Netherlands, App. No. 15375/89, 306-B Eur. CL H.R (ser. A) § 53
(1995), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57918. See
generally Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), availableat
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70326.
32. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1304; Fabri, supra note 19, at 153;
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 658; Kriebaum, Is the European Court of Human Rights an
Alternative, supra note 29, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note

29, at 233; Wildhaber & Wildhaber, Recent Case Law, supra note 20, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note I1, at 658.
33.

CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1305. See also Kriebaum, Is the European

Court of Human Rights an Alternative, supra note 29, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 233.
34. HARRIS ETAL., supra note I1, at 657-58.

35. See Depalle v. France, App. No. 34044/02, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 63, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97978.
36. See Sierpinski v. Poland, App. No. 38016/07, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 65, availableat
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-95590.
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serve alcoholic beverages3 7 or to extract gravel,3 8 among others, are
considered to be included in Article 1 only if their lasting nature can be
reasonably expected by the license-holder.3 9 From this perspective,
claims can also be considered possessions. 40 This is, for instance, how
the European Court construed in Pressos the legitimate expectation that
an unresolved claim will be decided in accordance with the general
law. 4 1 In sum, as the European Court observed in Kopecky:
"Possessions" can be either "existing possessions" or assets,
including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that
he or she has at least a "legitimate expectation" of obtaining
effective enjoyment of a property right. By way of contrast, the
hope of recognition of a property right which it has been
impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered a
"possession" within the meaning of Article I of Protocol No. 1,
nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the nonfulfilment of the condition. 42
It took some time before the first case on Article I was decided by

37.
A)

See Tre Traktarer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, App. No. 10873/84, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.

§ 55 (1989), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-57586.
38. See Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), App. No. 12033/86, 192 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 8-31

(1991), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57651.
39. CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1305.
40. See, e.g., Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, 301-8 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) § 62 (1994), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00157913; Gratzinger v. Czech, App. No. 39794/98, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. § 69, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-22710; Stretch v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 44277/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 32 (2003), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-61173.
41. See Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. v. Belgium, App. No. 17849/91, 332 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) § 31 (1995), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-58056; see also Anderson, supra note 10, at 546.
42. Kopecky v. Slovakia, App. No. 44912/98, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. § 35 (2004),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-66758; see also Viaqu
v. Romania, App. No. 75951/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 58 (2008), available at http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90065; Bulves AD v. Bulgaria, App. No.
3991/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 53, 57 (2009), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-90792. On legitimate expectations and the European Court, see generally
Ursula Kriebaum, Regulatory Takings: Balancingthe Interests of the Investor and the State, 8 J.
WORLD INV. & TR. 717, 734 (2007) [hereinafter Kriebaum, Regulatory Takings]; Pasquale De
Sena, Economic and Non-Economic Values in the Case Law of the European Court of Human
Rights [hereinafter De Sena, Economic and Non-Economic Values], in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 210; Wildhaber & Wildhaber, Recent Case
Law, supranote 20, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 661-62.
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the European Court. The increasingly complex regulations, derived
from the market-oriented policies favored in the continent during the
last decades, and the establishment of the individual right of petition
before the Court by Protocol 11 of the European Convention,4
prompted a large and authoritative case-law on Article 1.45
In conformity with this provision, state measures can interfere with
the peaceful enjoyment of possessions in three different degrees.
Deprivations, controls on the use of property, and other interferences
have been identified by the European Court of Human Rights as
distinct, but somehow connected rules.46 The fact that these rules are
related explains the general approach of the European Court when
considering cases under Article 1. Because the second and third rules
(deprivations and controls on the use) are particular instances of the first
rule (other interferences), 47 the tribunal will start by establishing
whether a deprivation or a control on the use of property has taken
place.4 8 Only if neither has occurred, will it study whether the state has
43. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§
60-63 (1976), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499.
The first case decided by the European Court concerning an interference with the property of a
foreigner was AGOST. See generally AGOSI v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9118/80, 108 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
00 1-57418; see also Kriebaum, Regulatory Takings,supra note 42, at 717.
44. In force since 1998. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Protocol No. 11, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=155&CM=4&CL=ENG.
45. See Gretton, supra note 22, at 291.
46. This test was first applied by the European Court in 1982. See Sporrong v. Sweden,
App. Nos. 7151/75 & 7152/75, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 61 (1982), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57580; see also Holy Monasteries v.
Greece (just satisfaction), App. Nos. 13092/87 & 13984/88, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 56
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57906;
(1994),
Carbonara v. Italy, App. No. 24638/94, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. § 58, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58595; Jahn v. Germany, App. Nos.
46720/99, 72203/01 & 72552/01, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. § 78, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-69560; see generally CLAYTON &
TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1302-03; MERRILLS & ROBERTSON, supra note 11, at 235; Fabri,
supra note 19, at 152; ARAI ET AL., supranote 30, at 864; HARRIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 666;
Wildhaber & Wildhaber, Recent CaseLaw, supra note 20, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW,
supra note 11, at 658; WHITE ET AL., supra note 28, at 478.
47. See, e.g., AGOSI, 108 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 48; see also James v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 8793/79, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 37 (1986), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57507; Adzhigovich v. Russia, App. No. 23202/05, Eur. Ct.
H.R. § 25 (2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00194869. Deprivations and controls on use-the second and third rules-cover the three main
legislative powers: the taking of private property for public use, the regulation of its use, and
taxation. CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1302-03.
48. In both cases there has to be a reasonable and foreseeable national legal basis for the
measure. Mountfield, supra note 15, at 141.
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interfered with this right in any other way. 49
The European Court has recently stated, "[T]he genuine, effective
exercise of the right protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not
depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may give rise to
positive obligations."50 In this sense, governments must act "in an
appropriate manner and with utmost consistency" so that their measures
are implemented "with reasonable clarity and coherence, in order to
avoid, in so far as possible, legal uncertainty and ambiguity for the
persons concerned by [them].',s As the Court has expressly recognized,
these positive duties of the state comprise a larger obligation: good
governance.5 2
IV. SOME COMMON PRINCIPLES

Under Article 1, the state can justify interferences with the right of
property "in the public interest," in relation with the second rule, and
"in the general interest," in relation with the third rule. It is unlikely that
any particular distinction was intended between public and general
interest. The European Court has not attempted to distinguish them
either. 53 Moreover, the tribunal has applied a single test for the three
rules at the moment of establishing whether interference is justified or
not. Each will require the achievement of a fair balance between the
interests of the community and those of the affected person. For this
purpose, the objectives of the correspondent measure must be
proportional to the means actually used for their fulfillment. The idea is
to avoid an excessive burden on the protected persons.5 4 In this regard,
the Court explained in Forminster:
[T]he character of interference, the aim pursued, the nature of
property rights interfered with, and the behaviour of the applicant
and the interfering State authorities are among the principle
factors material to the assessment whether the contested measure
49. See Tom ALLEN, PROPERTY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998, 110-12 (2005);
WHITE ET AL., supra note 28, at 347.

50. Sierpinski v. Poland, App. No. 38016/07, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 68, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ search.aspx?i=001-95590.
51. Id. § §71-72.
52. See, e.g., Moskal v. Poland, App. No. 10373/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 51, 72 (2009),
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-94009.
53. Gretton, supra note 22, at 281.
54.

SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INTHE BIT GENERATION 220 (2009). This author,

however, only considers the fair balance test to be applicable to the first and third rules (i.e., to
lesser interferences and controls on the use). See id. at 200, 220.
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respects the requisite fair balance and, notably, whether it
imposes a disproportionate burden on the applicants.5
In the application of this test, the state has consistently been given a
wide margin of appreciation-not only to identify the public or general
interest involved but also to assess if it prevails over that of individuals
or legal entities.6 This margin is wider in cases falling under the third
rule.
The Court has declared that "regional planning and
environmental conservation policies, where the community's general
interest is pre-eminent, confer on the State a margin of appreciation that
is greater than when exclusively civil rights are at stake."58 However
wide the margin, the European Court has expressly said that it is not
limitless-otherwise, the protection embodied in Article I would
become illusory. 59 The margin, therefore, has to be construed-in the
wording of this tribunal-"so as to guarantee to individuals that the
essence of their rights is protected." The payment of compensation
will generally play an important role in the determination of the
proportionality of an interference with property. 6 1 The European Court
openly declared so in James: "Clearly, compensation terms are material
to the assessment whether the contested legislation respects a fair
balance between the various interests at stake and, notably, whether it
does not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicants." 62
Given the common analytical approach adopted by this tribunal to all
interventions with property, the practical relevance of the distinction
among deprivations, controls on use, and other interferences lies in the
payment of compensation.6 3 According to the case-law of the European
55. Forminster Enters., Ltd. v. Czech, App. No. 38238/04 &38238/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2008), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-88813.
56. CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1314.
57. That is to say, controls on the use. See Sporrong v. Sweden, App. Nos. 7151/75 &
7152/75, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 69 (1982), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-57580; see also Holy Monasteries v. Greece, App. Nos. 13092/87 &
13984/88, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 70 (1994), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57906; Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 334 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 36 (1995), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx
?i=001-57967; see generally CLAYTON & TOMLINSoN, supranote 21, at 1303 & 1314.
58. Depalle v. France, App. No. 34044/02, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 84, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-97978.
59. Druistevni ziloina Pria v. Czech, App. No. 72034/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 91 (2008),
availableathttp://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-96873.
60. Id. §93.
61. Anderson, supra note 10, at 548. See also Tomuschat, The European Court of Human
Rights, supra note 11, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 652-53.
62. James v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 54 (1986),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57507.
63. Anderson, supra note 10, at 554.
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Commission and Court, controls on the use of property and other
interferences do not create a right to compensation. If these are
considered unlawful, however, the Court has repeatedly stated that they
should be repaired, "putting the applicant . . . in the position in which it
would have been had the violation not occurred." 64 Only in exceptional
circumstances will the European Court conclude that a total lack of
compensation is justifiable.
In the case of deprivation, the
Commission and the Court have considered that the protection of
Article I would be ineffective in the absence of a compensatory
principle equivalent to that of European comparative law. 6 Full
compensation is, nevertheless, not guaranteed in all circumstances.6 7

V. EXPROPRIATION

IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION

In conformity with the second sentence of Article 1, deprivations of
property are permitted if the respective state measure is adopted in the
public interest, subject to the conditions provided by national law, and
by the general principles of international law. Expropriations, as such,
are not mentioned in this provision. Nevertheless, the European Court
64. Zlinsat v. Bulgaria (just satisfaction), App. No. 57785/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 39 (2008),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-84315. See Kriebaum,
Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative, supra note 29, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 243. According to the European Court, the
finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary
damage sustained by an applicant. See, e.g., Hentrich v. France, App. No. 13616/88, 296-A Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-57903; Bulves AD v. Bulgaria, App. No. 3991/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90792.
65. Wildhaber & Wildhaber, Recent Case Law, supra note 20, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 659. But cf Tomuschat, The European Court of Human
Rights, supra note 11, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 654.
66. See, e.g., Pinnacle Meat Processors Co. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 33298/96, 27
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep 217 (1998), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-4429; Baner v. Sweden, App. No. 11763/85, 60 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 128 (ser. A) § 5 (1989), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-992; Lithgow v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9006/80, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. §
120 (ser. A) § 120 (1986), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-57526; see also Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent
Developments in InternationalLaw, in 176 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (RECUEIL DES CouRs) 259, 360 (1982); CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra
note 21, at 1311-13; Mountfield, supra note 15, at 141-42.
67. See, e.g., Holy Monasteries v. Greece (just satisfaction), App. Nos. 13092/87 &
13984/88, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 71 (1994), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57906; J.A. Pye, Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02,
2007-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 54, availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-82172; see also Wildhaber & Wildhaber, Recent Case Law, supra note 20, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note I1, at 659.
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has considered the notion of deprivation to cover not on, direct takings
of property but also measures that amount to them. The tribunal
explained in Sporrong:
In the absence of a formal expropriation, that is to say a transfer
of ownership, the Court . . . must look behind the appearances

and investigate the realities of the situation complained of . . .
Since the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are
"practical and effective" . . . it has to be ascertained whether that

situation amounted to a de facto expropriation.
According to Clare Ovey and Robin White, the extinction of the
rights of the owner will be the main criterion at the moment of
determining whether a deprivation has taken place.7 0 Ursula Kriebaum
points to a more accurate factor: there must not be any possible use or
economic value of the property remaining. 71 However, not all acts
producing this result will necessarily constitute an expropriation, for
they may be treated as a control on the use of property. Within this
context, the destruction of property will be tantamount to a
deprivation. Temyorary seizures of property will merely amount to a
control on the use. In any case, a deprivation requires the taking of the
whole bundle of rights. If only some of these are taken, the Court's
analysis will fall under the third and first rules (i.e., as controls on the
use, or other interferences).7 5 The European Court has been cautious in
finding that a measure amounts to a deprivation when there is no formal
extinction of legal rights, because the second rule requires a substantial
interference with the enjoyment of possessions. 76 For this reason, a
68. Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), App. No. 12033/86, 192 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 42 (1991),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57651.
69. Sporrong v. Sweden, App. Nos. 7151/75 & 7152/75, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 63
(1982), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57580. This is
the first description of an indirect taking given by the European Court. Wildhaber & Wildhaber,
Recent Case Law, supranote 20, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 667.
70.

WHITE ET AL., supra note 28, at 488.

71. Kriebaum, Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative, supra note 29, in
HuMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 238-39.
72. CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1308.
73. See, e.g., Akdivar v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. § 88 (1996),
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58062.
74. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
§ 63 (1976), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499.
75. Wildhaber & Wildhaber, Recent Case Law, supra note 20, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 659.
76. CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1308. The approach of the European Court
of Justice to the problem of indirect takings has been similar to that of the European Court of
Human Rights. See ALLEN, supra note 49, at 15-16; Bruno De Witte, Balancing of Economic
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restriction of rights will not constitute an expropriation, though it might
be considered a type of interference, under the residual category of
Article 17
One of the cases where the European Court of Human Rights did
find a deprivation of property, in the form of an indirect expropriation,
is Papamichalopoulos. The dispute related to the transfer of the
applicants' land to a Navy fund in Greece. Although such property was
not available for state disposal under Greek law at that moment, the
Navy constructed a base and a holiday resort in the area. The applicants
obtained domestic judicial recognition of their titles to the land, but
could not enforce these judgments. Different attempts were made to
obtain land of equal value in exchange from the authorities, but all
failed. The applicants further claimed damages for the land transfers
without success in the Greek courts.
The European Court found in Papamichalopoulos an interference
with the applicants' right of property. Although the applicants were
never formally expropriated, since the property was in fact transferred
to the Navy, they were "unable either to make use of their property or to
sell, bequeath, mortgage or make a gift of it." 78 The European Court
concluded that this interference was not for the purpose of controlling
the use of property and
that the loss of all ability to dispose of the land in issue, taken
together with the failure of the attempts made so far to remedy
the situation complained of, entailed sufficiently serious
consequences for the applicants de facto to have been
expropriated in a manner incompatible with their right to the
peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.7 9
An indirect taking was also found by the European Court in relation
with a different kind of state measure. In Hentrich, the applicants
bought land in France, over which the tax authorities of Alsace
exercised later a right of pre-emption based on a French law, then in
force. This norm allowed the state to offer the owners to pay the price
specified in the contract of sale and a ten percent premium provided for
by law when the sale price was considered to be too low by the
Law and Human Rights by the European Court ofJustice, in HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 199-201. See also, e.g., Case 4-73, J. Nold v. Comm'n of
the Eur. Comtys., 1974 E.C.R. 492; Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land RheinlandPfalz, 1979 E.C.R.
3729.
77. See, e.g., Matos e Silva, Ltd. v. Portugal, App. No. 15777/89, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
§§ 79, 85, availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58063.
78. Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 14556/89, 260-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 43
(1993), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57836.
79. Id. § 45.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

13

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 3

526

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24

government. The purpose of this right was to prevent tax evasion. The
applicants unsuccessfully challenged the measure adopted by the French
authorities in domestic courts, before turning to the European Court in
search of redress. The application of the fair balance test to this case led
this tribunal to find a violation of Article 1, mainly because: "as a
selected victim of the exercise of the right of pre-emption, Mrs Hentrich
'bore an individual and excessive burden' which could have been
rendered legitimate only if she had had the possibility -- which was
refused her -- of effectively challenging the measure taken against
her."80
Another example of an indirect expropriation is Pressos. In this case,
the applicants' ships were involved in collisions in territorial waters of
Belgium and the Netherlands as a result of the negligence of Belgian
pilots on board. Some of the applicants initiated legal proceedings
against the Belgian state, and others against a private company offering
pilot services. None were successful on account of a Belgian law that
retroactively exempted the state and other organizers of pilot services
from their liability for negligent acts.8 ' The European Court declared
that this law "simply extinguished, with retrospective effect going back
thirty years and without compensation, claims for very high damages
that the victims of the pilot accidents could have pursued against the
Belgian State or against the private companies concerned, and in some
cases even in proceedings that were already pending." 82
The tribunal found in Pressos that a fair balance between the
individual and collective interests was not kept. Therefore, an
interference with the applicants' right of property had taken place. The
Court concluded that a violation of Article I was committed, because
[t]he financial considerations cited by the Government and
their concern to bring Belgian law into line with the law of
neighbouring countries could warrant prospective legislation in
this area to derogate from the general law of tort.
Such considerations could not justify legislating with
retrospective effect with the aim and consequence of depriving
the applicants of their claims for compensation.8 3

80. Hentrich v. France, App. No. 13616/88, 296-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 49 (1994),
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57903.
81. Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. v. Belgium, App. No. 17849/91, 332 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) § 34 (1995), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00158056.
82. Id. § 39.
83. Id. § 43.
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VI. DEPRIVATIONS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
Guiso-Gallisay is yet another case in which the European Court
found a deprivation, this time under the second rule. The applicants
were Italian nationals who had inherited plots of building land in Nuoro,
Sardinia. A project to build low-rent housing and leisure structures on
this land was approved by the regional authorities. This project involved
the possession of the applicants' land with a view to its expropriation in
five years. After the authorities took physical possession of their land,
the applicants brought an action for damages before a domestic court
against the local municipality, claiming that the occupation of the land
was illegal and that the construction work had been completed without a
formal taking of the land and the correspondent payment of
compensation. The Nuoro court considered that the applicants had been
deprived of their property, by virtue of its irreversible alteration, on the
date on which the possession had ceased to be legal. The local tribunal
ordered the municipality to pay compensation, which it did.
The applicants claimed before the European Court that they had been
deprived of their land, as a result of its occupation and alteration,
without proper compensation. The Court concluded that, in the absence
of a formal expropriation order, the final judgment of the local tribunal
in Nouro, declaring the unlawful character of the occupation of the land
by the municipality, "had the effect of depriving the applicants of their
property within the meaning of the second" rule.8 4 In this case, the
European Court reiterated its views on lawfulness. It declared that this
principle "presupposes that the provisions of domestic law are
sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application."85
The tribunal considered legal certainty as an element of the rule of

law.8 6
In 2009, the European Court expressly related the concept of
deprivation with that of good governance in Moskal. The applicant was
a Polish national who had a son suffering from poor respiratory
conditions. Ms. Moskal filed an application with a local social-security
board asking for an early-retirement pension for persons raising children
with serious health problems, who required constant care. The socialsecurity board granted this pension to the applicant but later revoked it
because of doubts about the accuracy of the medical certificate attached
to Ms. Moskal's application for the pension. Ms. Moskal appealed
against this decision before regional and national courts, where the
measure of the local social-security board was upheld. After that, she
84. Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy, App. No. 58858/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 79, 96 (2005), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-71551.
85. Id. § 82.
86. See id.§§ 82, 93.
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complained before the European Court, claiming an unjustified
deprivation of property derived from the revocation of her acquired
right to an early-retirement pension. The Court started its analysis by
recognizing that:
[i]f . .. a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for
the payment as of right of a welfare benefit -whether conditional
or not on the prior payment of contributions- that legislation must
be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within the
ambit of Article I of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its
requirements.
The mere fact that a property right is subject to revocation in
certain circumstances does not prevent it from being a
"possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,
at least until it is revoked.
In this context, the tribunal had no problem in finding that Ms.
Moskal had a property right generated by the evaluation by the local
social-security board of her dossier attached to the pension application.
It also had no problem in judging that there was an interference with
Ms. Moskal's property, which was provided by law and in the public
interest.88 The European Court concluded, however, that the applicant
had suffered an excessive burden as a result of this interference,
particularly because she was faced with the total loss of her sole source
of income, which originated from an application lodged in good faith
and a state decision based on an error of assessment. In reaching this
conclusion, the tribunal related the notion of fair balance to that of good
governance, defined by the Court as a principle that "requires that
where an issue in the general interest is at stake it is incumbent on the
public authorities to act in good time, in an appropriate manner and with
utmost consistency."9 0 The tribunal went on to state that
[i]t is desirable that public authorities act with the utmost
scrupulousness, in particular when dealing with matters of vital
importance to individuals, such as welfare benefits and other
property rights. In the instant case, the Court considers that
having discovered their mistake the authorities failed in their duty

87. Moskal v. Poland, App. No. 10373/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 38, 40 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-94009.
88. Id. §§ 53, 57, 63.
89. Id §§ 68-69, 74.
90. Id. § 51.
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to act in good time and in an appropriate and consistent manner.9 1
VII. PUBLIC OR GENERAL INTEREST
Directly related with the fair balance test is the notion of public
interest. In conformity with the second sentence of Article 1, the
measure resulting in a deprivation must be aimed at this objective.
Although there is no conventional definition of such a term, the
European Court has considered it to be similar to that of general
interest, known in international law as public purpose. 92 This condition
will require a balancing of the individual and collective concerns. 9 3 The
object of the test is to differentiate-as Rosalyn Higgins worded it"takings for purely private gain on the part of the ruler, from those for
reasons related to the economic preferences of the country concerned." 94
The European Court has given the state great autonomy when
adopting measures that interfere with the right of property. For the
tribunal there is almost a presumption that a national measure is in the
public interest. 9 5 This explains its reluctance to review the identification
of the collective interest involved made by the state adopting the
respective measure. 96 In early cases related with takings of property, the
European Commission and Court held that states had an unlimited right
to determine the necessity of such deprivation. 97 This almost absolute
right has been replaced by the wide margin of appreciation illustrated in
James.
In James, the applicants were trustees, acting under a will, of an area
in central London where a large estate was developed. A leasehold law
conferred rights of acquisition to the occupants of the estate. A number
of them exercised this right and deprived the trustees of their ownership
in a number of properties. The applicants claimed that this compulsory
transfer gave rise to a violation of Article 1. In essence, the applicants
were complaining against the terms and conditions of the contested
legislation, not against the manner of execution of the law by a state

91. Id. § 72.
92. Fabri, supra note 19, at 158. See also Higgins, supra note 66, at 371; Anderson, supra
note 10, at 547; De Sena, Economic and Non-Economic Values, supra note 42, in HUMAN
RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 212.
93. WHITE ET AL., supra note 28, at 491.

94.

Higgins, supra note 66, at 371.

95. WHITE ET AL., supra note 28, at 492.
96. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1315; Mountfield, supra note 15, at
140; ARAI ET AL., supra note 30, at 879-81; HARRIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 667; WHITE ET AL.,

supra note 28, at 492.
97. Fabri, supra note 19, at 158.
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authority.98 From this perspective, the European Court started its
analysis of the situation by declaring:
[A] deprivation of property effected for no reason other than to
confer a private benefit on a private party cannot be "in the public
interest." Nonetheless, the compulsory transfer of property from
one individual to another may, depending upon the
circumstances, constitute a legitimate means for promoting the
public interest. 99
The Court declared in James that a taking of property, in pursuance
of a policy calculated to enhance social justice within the community,
can be properly described as being in the public interest. 00 It even
stated that an expropriation adopted in pursuance of a legitimate policy
may be in such an interest, even if the community at large has no direct
use or enjoyment of the property taken.' 0 The Court's general view on
the margin of appreciation was clearly expressed in this case. It
provides a clear guideline on how to approach other cases involving
deprivations of property for public purpose:
Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its
needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than
the international judge to appreciate what is "in the public
interest". Under the system of protection established by the
Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the
initial assessment both of the existence of a problem of public
concern warranting measures of deprivation of property and of
the remedial action to be taken ....
Furthermore, the notion of "public interest" is necessarily
extensive. In particular, as the Commission noted, the decision to
enact laws expropriating property will commonly involve
consideration of political, economic and social issues on which
opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ
widely. The Court, finding it natural that the margin of
appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social
and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the
legislature's judgment as to what is "in the public interest" unless

98. James v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57507.
99. Id. § 40.
100. Id. § 41.
101. Id. § §41, 45.
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that judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation.102
In other words, national authorities know the needs of their societies
better. 0 3 This extensive conception of public purpose makes it difficult
for a tribunal to deny the general interest claimed by the state adopting a
measure that deprives someone of his or her property.104 On this basis,
for instance, the European Court found that the leasehold law involved
in James was compatible with Article 1. This margin, although
considerable, is not without restrictions. As the European Court
declared in Broniowski, "the exercise of the State's discretion, even in
the context of the most complex reform of the State cannot entail
consequences at variance with Convention standards." 's H616ne Ruiz
Fabri concludes that "[t]he Court's review is limited in practice to
verifying whether, in the abstract, the deprivation of property has
pursued a legitimate aim in the public interest. This means that any
probing judicial review will focus on other criteria." 106

VIII. CONDITIONS PROVIDED

BY LAW

In conformity with the second sentence of Article 1, an expropriated
measure must be subject to the conditions established by municipal law.
This means that any taking in breach of domestic norms amounts to a
violation of Article 1: the act of deprivation adopted by the state must
have a basis in municipal rules.' 0 7 The European Court has considered
this condition not merely to refer back to domestic norms, but also to
the quality of these rules, "requiring it to be compatible with the rule of
law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the
Convention."tos
National law should, therefore, be "adequately accessible and
sufficiently precise."' 09 In addition, it must have foreseeable
consequences, and the taking itself should be surrounded by basic

102.
103.

d § 46.
Fabri,supra note 19, at 158.

104.

Id. at 159.

105. Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70326.
106. Fabri, supra note 19, at 159.
107.

§ 183 (2005),

WHITE ET AL., supranote 28, at 491.

108. Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 67 (1984),
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57533.
109. Lithgow v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9006/80, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 120 (ser. A) §
110 (1986), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-57526.
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procedural safeguards." 0 Whether the deprivation is subject to the
conditions provided by municipal law requires a case-by-case analysis,
where the European Court will only look for manifest violations of
domestic norms. However, it will not examine the correct application
of national law. In this respect, the European Court will refer to the
judgment of the relevant domestic court in order not to function as a
"fourth instance."" 2
The second sentence of Article 1 also provides that any taking in
breach of the general principles of international law will amount to a
violation. These principles entitle non-nationals to protection against
arbitrary expropriations by the host state in the form of compensation
for the loss of their property.1 3 Ruiz Fabri explains that a special
reference to those principles was the result of a compromise between
states, which refused any mention of compensation, and states which
desired such a mention. 1 The case-law of the Court generally describes
a form of protection that is ver close to the requirements of the
principles of international law. 1s Nevertheless, the standard of
compensation is only incorporated for cases of deprivation, not for those
related with controls on the use or other interferences with property." 6
As a consequence, Article I would strongly imply that there is no such
duty for normal state regulation.' Unjustified expropriations, however,
should be compensated.
The European Court has concluded that a reference to the general
principles of international law does not entitle nationals of the
expropriating state to this protection.11 9 While such an approach
conforms to the minimum standard enjoyed by foreigners under
110. Hentrich v. France, App. No. 13616/88, 296-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 42 (1994),
E.g., the
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57903.
availability of procedural remedies to prevent the arbitrary adoption and exercise of state
measures. See De Sena, Economic and Non-Economic Values, supra note 42, in HUMAN RIGHTS
ININTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 215-16.

111.

Fabri,supra note 19, at 159. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 49, at 95.

112.

ARAI ET AL., supra note 30, at 885.

113. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 28, at 492; see also Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal,
App. No. 73049/01, 2007-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 9 (Caflisch & Cabral Barreto, J.J., dissenting),
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-78981.
114. Fabri,supranote 19, at 151.
115. Id.atl73.
116. See Higgins, supra note 66, at 360; CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1313;
Mountfield, supra note 15, at 141-42.
117. Katia Yannaca-Small, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: How to
Draw the Line?, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE

TO THE KEY ISSUES 445,452 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010).

118.

Kriebaum, Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative, supra note 29, in

HUMAN RiGHTS ININTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supranote 29, at 240.

119.

See Anderson, supra note 10, at 549.
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international law, it contradicts the equal application of human rights
law in the host-state. It also runs counter the European Convention
itself, for Article 14 expressly prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment
of its substantive rights on grounds of national origin. The reason for
this position was explained in James in the following terms:
Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context
of a social reform, there may well be good grounds for drawing a
distinction between nationals and non-nationals as far as
compensation is concerned. To begin with, non-nationals are
more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they
will generally have played no part in the election or designation
of its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. Secondly,
although a taking of property must always be effected in the
public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals
and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for
requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest

than non-nationals.120
The tribunal confirmed their exclusion from Article 1 by referring to
the travauxprdparatoiresof the Protocol.121 Consequently, there would
be no compensation for the deprivations of the property of nationals of
the host state, at least in theory. But due to the application of the fair
balance test, their position is rarely (if ever) less favorable than that of
non-nationals.122 The sum paid as compensation is part of the
proportionality assessment of the state measure.' 2 3 As the European
Court declared in Holy Monasteries: "[T]he taking of property without
payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally
constitute a disproportionate interference and a total lack of
compensation can be considered justifiable under Article I . . . only in
120. James v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 63 (1986),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57507.
See also
Lithgow v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9006/80, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 120 (ser. A) § 111-19
(1986),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57526.
Interestingly enough, the European Court had not found an expropriation of a foreigner by 2009.
See Kriebaum, Is the European Court offHuman Rights an Alternative, supra note 29, in HUMAN
RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 241-42.

121.
122.

James, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 64.
Anderson, supra 10, at 549; De Sena, Economic and Non-Economic Values, supra

note 42, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 214, 217;

Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights, supra note 11, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 652-53.
123. Kriebaum, Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative, supra note 29, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 240-41. See also
Wildhaber & Wildhaber, Recent Case Law, supra note 20, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW,

supra note 11, at 672-73.
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exceptional circumstances." 24
Regarding the standard of compensation in case of deprivation, the
Court has not followed international law. While according to the latter,
the alien is entitled to a prompt, adequate, and effective compensation
of the value of his or her property taken, Article 1 requires neither this
standard nor the same level of compensation for every category of
deprivation.125 In principle, the corresponding amount must be
reasonably related to the value of the property taken.126 Nevertheless,
the European Court will give the state a wide margin of appreciation
when it comes to this.127 That is to say, it will respect the judgment of
the domestic authorities on the terms and conditions of the
compensation, unless it is manifestly without reasonable foundation.128
For this purpose, the European Court will distinguish between
nationalizations and other forms of takings, as the state's margin of
appreciation appears to be wider in the former.' 29 The tribunal explained
its view on the subject in Lithgow: "Article 1 (Pl-1) does not . . .
guarantee a right to full compensation in all circumstances, since
legitimate objectives of 'public interest', such as pursued in measures of
economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice,
may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value." 3 0
The proportionality test is not used in European human rights law to
decide whether an expropriation has occurred but to establish a fair
balance between the interests of the state and the affected person.' 3 ' As
a result, the application of this test can lead to the payment of an amount
which is less than the fair market value of the respective property.132 I
any case, compensation must be adequate. That is, it should take into
account the damage arising from the length of the deprivation, and be
paid within a reasonable time.' 3 3 Excessive delays in receiving final
compensation by those deprived of their property will amount to a
124. Holy Monasteries v. Greece (just satisfaction), App. Nos. 13092/87 & 13984/88, 301A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 71 (1994), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=00 1-57906.
125. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 681.
126. Kriebaum, Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative, supra note 29, in
HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 240.

127. Fabri, supra note 19, at 165.
128. Id. at 166.
129. Id.
130. Lithgow v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9006/80, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 120 (ser. A)
§ 121 (1986), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57526.
See also Fabri, supra note 19, at 166, 170; HARRIS ET AL., supra note 11, at 682.
131.

CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 282.

132.

See Kriebaum, Is the EuropeanCourt ofHuman Rights an Alternative, supra note 29,

in HUMAN RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 29, at 241.

133. Guillemin v. France, App. No. 19632/92, 1997-1 Eur. Ct. H.R.
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/searchaspx?i=00 1-58019.
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breach of the fair balance requirement.134
IX. CONTROLS ON THE USE OF PROPERTY

The second paragraph of Article I refers to state measures that fall
short of deprivation but interfere with the right of property to a higher
degree than those established in the first sentence of this provision. The
power of the state to enforce those laws that are necessary to control the
use, enjoyment, or disposition of property in conformity with the
general interest,' 3 5 or to secure the payment of taxes,' 3 6 is wide. So is its
margin of appreciation to judge the necessity of the measure adopted,
from the standpoint of the principle of fair balance. 3 7 This means that
the review of the state action by the European Court will focus on the
establishment of a reasonable relationship of proportionality between
the means employed and the aim sought to be realized. 3 8
Compensation will not always be payable for controls on use of
property. Its availability, however, will be one of the factors taken into
account in the assessment of the balance test, and its payment should
normally support a finding of non-violation of Article 1.139 This
criterion of fair balance is flexible: a measure will be disproportionate
when the public interest could have been satisfied without imposing an
excessive burden on someone.14 0 In practice, the European Court will
not easily conclude that a fair balance between the individual and
community interest was lacking.141 Chassagnou and Hutten-Czapska
are rare examples of cases in which the Court found state authorities

134. Almeida Garrett v. Portugal, App. Nos. 29813/96 & 30229/96, 2000-1 Eur. Ct. H.R.
54 (2000), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58417.
135. See ALLEN, supra note 49, at 119.
136. Id.
137.

§

CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1317.

138. Jacobsson v. Sweden (No. 1), App. No. 10842/84, 163 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 55
(1989), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57423. See also
AGOSI v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9118/80, 108 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 52 (1986),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-57418; Mellacher v.
Austria, App. Nos. 10522/83, 11011/84 & 11070/84, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 48 (1989),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57616; Spadea v. Italy,
App. No. 12868/87, 315-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 33 (1995), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/sites/eng/pages/searchaspx?i=001 -57937.
139. Nevertheless, in several cases the European Commission and Court have concluded
that the challenged measure was proportionate, notwithstanding the failure to compensate the
affected applicant for the reduction in the value of his property. Anderson, supra note 10, at
550-51.
140.

ALLEN, supra note 49, at 286.

141.

See id. at 119; ARA ET AL., supra note 30, at 888-89.
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failed the proportionality test when controlling the use of property.142
Chassagnou was referred by the European Commission to the Court
and was based on an application lodged by ten French nationals
claiming that the compulsory transfer of the hunting rights over their
land to a municipal hunters association constituted a violation of
Article 1.143 The claimants were forced to tolerate the presence of armed
men and gun dogs on their land every year, even though they did not
want to hunt on their land, and objected on ethical grounds to the fact
that others might come to it and do so.144 Although the Court noted that
the claimants had not been deprived of their right of property, it also
noted that the compulsory transfer of their hunting rights prevented
them from using these rights which are directly linked to that of
property. 4 5
The tribunal did recognize in Chassagnou a general interest in a law
aimed at avoiding unregulated hunting and encouraging the rational
management of game stocks.146 Nonetheless, it concluded that the result
of the concrete measure established by such a law 47 placed the
claimants in a situation which upset the fair balance between the
protection of the right of property and the requirements of the general
interest.148 As a consequence, the European Court found the control on
use to constitute a violation of Article 1.149
Hutten-Czapska also originated in an application lodged with the
European Commission, later transferred to the Court when Protocol 11
to the European Convention came into force.15 0 The claimant
complained about the situation created by the implementation of laws
which imposed tenancy agreements and set an inadequate level of
chargeable rent on her property in Poland.' 5' These measures were
implemented as part of special lease-schemes applied during the
communist regime and temporarily after its demise.1 52 As in
142. Another case in which a control of the use was found is Immobiliare Saffi. See
generally Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, App. No. 22774/93, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
-58292.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001
143. See generally Chassagnou v. France, App. Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 & 28443/95,
1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R., availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00158288.
144. Id. § 72.
145. Id. § 74.
146. Id. § 79.
147. This is compelling small landowners to transfer hunting rights over their land so that
others can make use of it in a way which is totally incompatible with their beliefs.
148. Chassagnou, 1999-III Eur. Ct. H.R. § 85.
149. Id.
150. See generally Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005),
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-68364.
151. Id. § 154.
152. Id. § 152.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol24/iss3/3

24

Lopez-Escarcena: Interferences with Property Under European Human Rights Law

2012]1

INTERFERENCES WITH PROPERTY UNDER EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

537

Chassagnou,the European Court noted that the claimant never lost her
right to sell her property and that the authorities did not apply any
measures resulting in the transfer of her ownership.' 53 Nevertheless, it
acknowledged the fact that
[she] could not exercise her right of use in terms of physical
possession as the house had been occupied by the tenants and that
her rights in respect of letting the flats, including her right to
receive rent and to terminate leases, had been subject to a number
of statutory limitations. . .154
In Hutten-Czapska, the Court again recognized a general interest in
the laws enacted and implemented by the state. In this case, laws aimed
at securing the social protection of tenants and ensuring the gradual
transition from state-controlled rent to a fully negotiated contractual
rent, during the period of reform after the collapse of a communist
regime.1 55 The Court, however, found that the laws enacted and
implemented by the state entailed a disproportionate and excessive
burden on the claimant, one which cannot be justified by any legitimate
interest of the community pursued by it.15 6
X. LAWFULNESS AND MEASURES OF CONTROL

Even though Article 1 does not expressly require controls on the use
of property to be in conformity with law, the European Court has
considered itself competent to review the lawfulness of these
measures.157 According to the Court:
a norm cannot be regarded as a "law" within the meaning of the
Convention unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to
enable the citizen to regulate his conduct; an individual must be
able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree

that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a
given action may entail . . . . A law may still satisfy the

requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to
take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is

153. Id. § 160.
154. Id. § 160.
155. Id. § 178. The Court had no jurisdiction over the facts that occurred before the
ratification of Poland of the First Protocol to the European Convention in 1994. See id. § 140.
156. Id § 188.
157.

ARAi ET AL., supra note 30, at 890-91.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

25

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 3

538

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24

.Is
reasonable in the circumstances, the[se] consequences ...
This requirement of lawfulness presupposes, among other things, the
existence of procedural guarantees affording the individual or legal
entity a reasonable opportunity to challenge the respective measure
before an independent body.159 The tribunal will respect the
legislature's judgment on the general interest involved in cases of
control on the use, unless that appraisal is manifestly not in accordance
with domestic law 60 or without reasonable foundation.161 In this
context, purposes considered to be in the general interest are, for
instance, social and economic policies related with town planning;1 6 2
alcohol consumption;16 3 housing;164 the protection of nature' 6 5 and the
environment;166 and the combat of international drugs trafficking.167
Regarding taxes, contributions, and penalties, the European
Commission has declared that taxation measures will adversely affect
the guarantee established in the second paragraph of Article 1 only if
they place an excessive burden on the person concerned or
fundamentally interfere with his financial position.16 8 In relation with
measures taken by the state to enforce tax obligations, the European
158. Forminster Enters., Ltd. v. Czech, App. Nos. 38238/04 & 38238/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. §
65 (2008), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-88813. See
also Sun v. Russia, App. No. 31004/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 27 (2009), availableat http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91128.
159. Drulstevni zloina Pria v. Czech, App. No. 72034/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 91 (2008),
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-96873.
160. Tre Trakt6rer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, App. No. 10873/84, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §
58 (1989), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57586.
161. Mellacher v. Austria, App. Nos. 0522/83, 11011/84 & 11070/84, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) § 45 (1989), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00157616.
162. Jacobsson v. Sweden (No. 1), App. No. 10842/84, 163 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 55
(1989), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-57423.
163. See Tre TraktdrerAktiebolag, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 58.
164. See Mellacher, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 45.
165. See generally Fredin v. Sweden (No.1), App. No. 12033/86, 192 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1991), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-57651.
166. See Pine Valley Devs., Ltd. v. Ireland, App. No. 12742/87, 222 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1991), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-=57711.
167. See generally Air Canada v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18465/91, 316-A Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1995), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00157939.
168. See generally Svenska Mgmt. Grp. AB v. Sweden, App. No. 11036/84, 45 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 211 (1985), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-72454; Wasa Liv Omsesidigt v. Sweden, App. No. 13013/87, 58 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 163 (1988), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-319; Travers v. Italy, App. No. 15117/89, 80-B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 5 (1995), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-86548.
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Court has held that it will respect the authorities' assessment unless it is
devoid of reasonable foundation.169 As a result, the second paragraph of
Article I allows national authorities an almost unlimited power to
impose restrictions on the use of property in accordance with the
general interest.' 7 0
In contrast with the narrow reading given by the European Court to
the notion of deprivation, the concept of control on the use of property
has received a wider one.' 7 ' Clayton and Tomlinson point out that the
elimination of one of the bundle of rights comprising ownership, for
instance, will usually not be enough to deprive someone of his or her
ownership, but this infringement may amount to a control on the use of
property.
However, not all interferences short of deprivation will
necessarily be considered such an act by the European Court.
A state may control the use of property by requiring certain actions
or imposing certain restrictions on the activities of individuals and legal
entities. 174 The European Court has a longstanding tendency to classify
as controls on use, measures that by most ordinary standards would be
considered deprivations.17 5 The seizure of obscene publications;17 6
refusal to register as certified accountants;' 7 7 withdrawal of licenses;178
rent controls;' 79 plannin restrictions; so temporary seizure of property
in criminal proceedings;
temporary seizure of an aircraft for drugs

169. Gasus Dosier v. Netherlands, App. No. 15375/89, 306-B Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A)
(1995), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57918.

§ 60

170.
171.

ARAI ET AL., supra note 30, at 887.
See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 21, at 1309.

172.

Id.

173.
174.

HARRIS ET AL., supranote 11, at 686.
See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supranote 2 1, at 1309; HARRIS ET AL., supra note 11, at

687.
175. ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 553.
176. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§
60-63 (1976), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499.
177. See Van Marle v. Netherlands, App. Nos. 8543/79, 8674/79, 8675/79 & 8685/79, 101
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 15 (1986), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-57590, § 15.
178. See Tre Trakt6rer Aktiebolag v. Sweden, App. No. 10873/84, 159 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) § 11 (1989), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57586.
See also Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), App. No. 12033/86, 192 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 20 (1991),
availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57651.
179. See Mellacher v. Austria, App. Nos. 0522/83, 11011/84 & 11070/84, 169 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) § 10 (1989), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=
001-57616.
180. See Pine Valley Devs., Ltd. v. Ireland, App. No. 12742/87, 222 Eur. Ct. H.R., §§ 1012 (ser. A) (1991), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001=57711.
181. See Raimondo v. Italy, 281-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) §§ 12-13 (1994).
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enforcement; 182 retrospective tax legislation; 183 and a sequestration
measure;184 are all examples of control on the use of property. Under the
second paragraph of Article 1, states are even entitled to adopt measures
which affect the execution of contracts in force.' 85
XI. OTHER INTERFERENCES

The European Court of Human Rights first distinguished state
interferences with property, different from deprivations or controls on
its use, in the most widely cited judgment under Article 1 of the
Protocol.' 8 6 In Sporrong, the Swedish government had granted longterm expropriation permits to the city of Stockholm. 8 7 Although not
depriving the applicants' rights by themselves these permits gave the
authorities the power to do so in the future.189 The city of Stockholm
then adopted prohibitions on construction on the applicants'
properties. 1 After being in force for twenty three and eight years,
respectively, Mr. Sporrong and Mr. L6nnroth complained that these
permits made it impossible to sell or build anything in these properties
and difficult to invest or obtain mortgages for them.190 The applicants
argued that this situation amounted to an interference with their right to
a peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.' 9 ' The European
Commission of Human Rights found no violation of Article 1, and
concluded that the measures were enforced in the general interest and
were thus justifiable.' 92
The approach of the European Court in this case was both different
and novel. Before Sporrong, it was generally assumed that claims
related with Article I should take the form of either a deprivation or a
182.

See Air Canada v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18465/91, 316-A Eur. Crt. H.R. (Ser.

§ 5 (1995), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57939.
183. See Nat'1 & Provincial Bldg. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., § 22 (Oct. 23, 1997).
184. See Ismayilov v. Russia, App. No. 30352/03, Eur. Ct. H.R, §§ 30, 33 & 35 (2008);
Sun v. Russia, App. No. 31004/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 24-25 (2009), available at

A)

http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-91128.
185. Mellacher v. Austria, App. Nos. 0522/83, 11011/84 & 11070/84, 169 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) § 51 (1989), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00157616.
186. Yannaca-Small, supra note 117, at 463.
187. Under the 1972 Expropriation Act. See Sporrong v. Sweden, App. Nos. 7151/75 &
7152/75, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) § 11-36 (1982), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57580.
188. See id.§ 11-36.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Higgins, supra note 66, at 344.
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control on the use of property. In this case, the European Court declared
that the state can interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions
by measures that do not amount to deprivations or controls on its use.
Applying the fair balance test between the individual and community
interests, the Court concluded that a violation of the rule established in
the first sentence of Article I had taken place.193
Loizidou is another example of a finding on other interferences. This
case originated in an application against Turkey lodged with the
European Commission by a Cypriot national.194 Mrs. Loizidou owned
land in northern Cyprus before the Turkish occupation. 195 After it, she
was prevented from returning and enjoying her property.' 9 6 The Court
considered the continuous denial of access to Mrs. Loizidou's land by
Turkish military personnel as an interference with her rights under
Article 1.197 However, it did not regard the violation as a deprivation or
a control on the use of property.19 The tribunal regarded the breach to
"clearly fall . . . within the meaning of the first sentence of that
provision . . . as an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of

possessions" and observed "that hindrance can amount to a violation of
the Convention just like a legal impediment."' 99
The European Court also dealt with other interferences in one of the
numerous cases involving claims of restitution of property from central
and eastern European states.200 Broniowski relates to the re-drawing of
the eastern border of Poland after the Second World War along the Bug
River.2 0 ' Polish nationals living in those territories beyond it were then
repatriated and had to abandon their proper202 Poland took upon itself
the obligation to compensate these people.
As other repatriates, Mr.
Broniowski was entitled to buy land from the state and have the value of
his abandoned property considered in the purchase price.20 4 Because of
the number of persons involved in this scheme, Poland decided to
reduce the pool of land available to them by excluding state agricultural

§ 11-36.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See generally Sporrong,App. Nos. 7151/75,52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
See generally Loizidou v. Turkey, Dec. 18, 1996, Eur. Ct. H.R., § 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.

198.

Id.

199.
200.

Id.§ 63.
For more on these types of cases, see Wildhaber & Wildhaber, Recent Case Law,

supra note 20, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw, supra note 11, at 668-70.

201. See generally Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2005), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70326.
202.

Id.

203.
204.

Id.
Id.
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and military property. 205 The Polish state was therefore unable to fulfill
its obligation of compensation. 2 0 6 When this exclusion was later
declared unconstitutional, Poland considered its duty to be discharged
towards all those repatriates that had been somehow compensated.
Mr. Broniowski was in this situation: he had received approximately
two percent of the value of the house and land abandoned by his
208
grandmother. Applying the fair balance test, however, the European

Court concluded that the applicant "as an individual . . . had to bear a

disproportionate and excessive burden which cannot be justified in
terms of the legitimate general community interest pursued by the
authorities."2 09 A violation of Article I was thus found.2
Although the condition of public or general interest is not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Article 1, the European Court has
considered it applicable to any interference by the host-state within this
provision. In Beyeler, the tribunal declared:
The principle of a "fair balance" inherent in Article 1 of Protocol
No. I itself presupposes the existence of a general interest of the
community . . . it should be reiterated that the various rules

incorporated in Article I are not distinct in the sense of being
unconnected and that the second and third rules are concerned
only with particular instances . . . One of the effects of this is that

the existence of a "public interest" required under the second
sentence, or the "general interest" referred to in the second
paragraph, are in fact corollaries of the principle set forth in the
first sentence, so that an interference with the exercise of the right
to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions within the meaning of
the first sentence of Article 1 must also pursue an aim in the

public interest. 2 11
The distinction between deprivations and controls on the use of
possessions is not always easy. When property is clearly affected by a
state measure and it is not possible to identify a deprivation or a control
on its use, the European Court will decide the respective case in

205. From 1944 to 1953, 1,240,000 persons were repatriated. Id. § 12.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. § 187.
210. Id.
211. Beyeler v. Italy, (App. no. 33202/96), Eur. Ct. H.R. § 111 (2000). See, e.g., Viaqu v.
Romania, App. No. 75951/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 73 (2008), available at http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90065.
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conformity with the rule laid down in the first sentence of Article 1.212
Other interferences are, therefore, a residual category in this
provision.2 13
The Court has adopted a broad approach to the notion of the control
on the use of property, leaving comparatively few cases to be
considered under this rule. The European Commission and Court had
found violations to the residual type of Article 1, for instance, in the
refusal of a housing license to an applicant to live in his own house;214
the provisional transfer of the applicants' land to other landowners as
part of a consolidation plan;2 15 the annulment by law of an arbitration
award in favor of the applicants; 2 16 an urban development scheme
which impeded the development of the applicant's property for many
years;217 and public interest declarations;-issued as a preliminary
expropriation-and prohibitions to build or change the use of certain
parcels of land.21 8 More recently, cases dealing with governmental and
administrative partiality and arbitrariness have been solved in
conformity with the first rule. 2 19 In all, David Anderson observes that
other interferences: "[have] been applied to both restrictions which are
consistent with Article 1 and might just as well have been characterized
as controls of use, and to particularly blatant interferences which could
easily have been described as deprivations." 220
XII. CONCLUSION

Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol recognizes three different,
but related, rules. To all of these, the European Court applies a single
balancing-test to establish if the measure interfering with the right of
property is justifiable or not. National authorities have a wide margin of
appreciation at the moment of establishing whether this test is fulfilled
212.

See ALASTAIR MOWBRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON

HUMAN RIGHTs 924 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 2007).

213. ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 546; see also Gretton, supra note 22, at 278.
214. See Wiggins v. United Kingdom, (App. no. 7456/76), Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 40, 42 (1979).
215. See generally Ekner v. Austria, (App. No. 9616/81), Eur. Ct. H.R (1987).
216. See Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, 301-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) § 32 (1994), availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57913.
217. In fact, more than 16 years. See Phocas v. France, Apr. 23, 1996, Eur. Ct. H.R., §§ 89,11, 14-15 (1996).
218. See Matos e Silva, Ltd. v. Portugal, App. No. 15777/89, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 79,
85, availableat http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58063.
219. Wildhaber & Wildhaber, Recent Case Law, supra note 20, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 11, at 674-76. See generally Intersplav v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
§§ 29, 32-33; Smimov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., §§ 53, 55, 59.
220. ANDERsON,supra note 10, at 551-52.
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or not. A measure that interferes with the right of property to a higher
degree than the residual category, but falls short of a deprivation, is a
control on the use. The state may exercise this control by requiring
certain actions or imposing certain restrictions in the activities of
persons. In this respect, the power of the state is almost unlimited. The
European Court will respect the judgment of the national authorities
regarding the general interest involved, unless this assessment is
manifestly not in accordance with law or without reasonable foundation.
As with other interferences, the control on the use of property does not
create a right to compensation for those affected by the respective
measure, as long as the interference is not considered unlawful.
The expropriated measure must be based in domestic norms that are
compatible with the rule of law. An international minimum standard is
recognized in this regard, within the limits of the wording of Article 1:
non-nationals affected by the measure adopted by the respective state
are entitled to compensation. In practice, both nationals and foreigners
are compensated for deprivations. As a general rule, the amount
required by this provision should be reasonably related with the value of
the taken property. Nevertheless, facts that would normally be classified
as deprivations might be considered controls on use by this tribunal, or
even other interferences. This situation, and the lack of an absolute
standard of compensation for the deprivation of property, allows the
European Court to take into account not only the interests of the
protected individual or legal entity, but also those of the state, in case of
an interference with the right of property.
Recently, the European Court has related Article 1 of the First
Optional Protocol with the notion of good governance. This obligation
of the state involves certain positive duties, such as acting timely, with
reasonable clarity and utmost consistency. Its aim is to avoid, as far as
possible, legal uncertainty and ambiguity. To this effect, domestic laws
must be sufficiently accessible, precise, and foreseeable in their
application, and state measures must be implemented with coherence. In
the Court's view, good governance is an essential element of the rule of
law.
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